incentive bidding mechanism

基本解释

Using mechanism design theory and marginal cost pricing theory, an incentive compatible bidding mechanism is introduced for power generation competition in electricity markets.
基於機制設計理論和邊際成本定價理論，發展了一種具有激勵相容特性的發電市場競價機制。
According to mechanism design theory, a power bidding mechanism existing incentive and compatibility features is designed.
根據機制設計理論，設計了一種具有激勵相容特性的電力競價機制。
The second-price and first-price collusive bidding mechanism are found to be incentive compatible and efficient direct-revelation collusive mechanism.
本文在擴展的獨立私有價值模型下，考慮第二價格和第一價格拍賣機制下的串通出價行爲和賣方對串通出價的反映。